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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In September 2007, Genesco, Inc. (―Genesco‖) filed the first major material 
adverse change (―MAC‖) case with a Tennessee choice of law provision against The 
Finish Line, Inc. (―Finish Line‖).1  Genesco, a Nashville-based footwear retailer, filed 
suit to enforce the merger agreement it had entered into with Finish Line on June 17, 
2007 (the ―Merger Agreement‖).2  At the time the Merger Agreement was signed, 
Genesco had received merger offers from The Foot Locker, Inc. and Finish Line.3  
Genesco declined offers from The Foot Locker, Inc. of $46 per share4 and $51 per 
share5 in anticipation of receiving a higher bid from Finish Line.6   
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and his parents for their guidance over the years.  Bobak thanks his wife, Claire, for all her love, 
support, and patience during these last three years of law school.  Bobak also thanks his mother, Sedi, 
for supporting him in his decision to pursue a career in law.  
1 Complaint for Specific Performance of Obligations Under Agreement and Plan of Merger at 1-2, 
Genesco, Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-II (Tenn. Ch. Ct. filed Sept. 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.genesco.com/?g=litigation_library.litigation_library (follow ―01 Complaint Filed by 
Genesco‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
2 Id. at 1, 3. 
3 Id. at 3, 6. 
4 Id. at 6; Press Release, Genesco Inc., Genesco Statement (Apr. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/08-06-
2007/0004640307&EDATE=. 
5 Complaint, supra note 1, at 3, 6; Press Release, Genesco Inc., Genesco Announces Review of 
Strategic Alternatives; Company Reports Receipt and Rejection of Acquisition Proposal at $51 Per 
Share (May 31, 2007), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-
bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/05-31-2007/0004598837&EDATE=. 
6 Complaint, supra note 1, at 6.   
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 On June 18, 2007, Finish Line and Genesco announced the execution of the 
Merger Agreement under which Genesco would merge into a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Finish Line in exchange for ―$54.50 in cash per outstanding share of 
Genesco common stock.‖7  Finish Line was the smaller company in terms of 
revenue generation and operations; therefore, it chose to pursue a highly leveraged 
transaction, using senior secured credit facilities and unsecured senior notes to 
finance the merger.8  Contemporaneously, Finish Line and its financial backers, UBS 
Securities LLC and UBS Loan Finance LLC (collectively ―UBS‖), executed a 
commitment letter (the ―Commitment Letter‖) providing the $1.84 billion required 
to accomplish the transaction.9  The Merger Agreement and Commitment Letter 
included identical MAC clauses.10  Significantly, the Merger Agreement was governed 
by Tennessee law; whereas, the Commitment Letter was governed by New York 
law.11  Following execution of the Merger Agreement, both parties continued their 
due diligence and proceeded to meet the conditions precedent to closing the 
merger.12 
 On August 30, 2007, Genesco announced that its second quarter earnings 
had fallen below expectations and reported a $0.13 loss per share for the second 
                                                 
7 Id. at 3; Press Release, Genesco, Inc., Finish Line to Acquire Genesco Creating Leading $2.8 Billion 
Retailer (June 18, 2007), available at http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/preview/phoenix.zhtml?c=75042&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1016370&highlight=; see also 
Genesco Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 2.1, at 3 (Jun. 18, 2007), available at 
http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/preview/phoenix.zhtml?c=75042&p=irolsec&secCat01.1_rs=71&secCat01.1_rc=10 (follow 
―6/18/07 8-K‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Merger Agreement]. 
8 Complaint, supra note 1, at 14. 
9 Id.; Defendants‘ Answer, Counterclaim, and Third-Party Claim for Declaratory Relief at 19-20, 
Genesco Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-II (Tenn. Ch. Ct. filed Sept. 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.genesco.com/?g=litigation_library.litigation_library (follow ―10 Finish Line Answer 
Counterclaim and 3rd Party Calim for Declatory Relief‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Answer]. 
10 Answer, supra note 9, at 21. 
11 Posting of Paul M. Bush to M & A Law Prof Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2007/09/genesco-bring-i.html (Sept. 24, 2007, 13:03 
EST). 
12 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 13. 
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quarter.13  The loss was ―the largest dollar decline in operating income in 10 years‖ 
for Genesco.14  In response to the decline and in light of its recent write-down of 
over $10 billion in sub-prime mortgage debt, UBS began to reevaluate its 
commitment to the merger.15  UBS sent letters to Finish Line on September 11 and 
13, 2007, questioning whether Genesco had suffered a MAC.16  UBS requested 
updated financial data to determine whether Genesco had experienced a MAC.17  
Genesco viewed the request as more than a delay tactic and feared that UBS ―was 
attempting to renege on its commitments.‖18  As such, Genesco filed suit in the 
Chancery Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, as provided in the choice of 
forum provision of the Merger Agreement.19   
 In its complaint, Genesco alleged that Finish Line breached the contract for 
numerous reasons and sought specific performance of the Merger Agreement.20  
However, ―[f]rom the outset of the lawsuit, all parties recognized that a ruling on 
whether a MAC had occurred was determinative of Genesco‘s claim of specific 
performance and Finish Line‘s and UBS‘s defense to that claim.‖21  The Tennessee 
trial court issued a Memorandum and Order finding that a MAC had occurred; but 
                                                 
13 Genesco Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 5 (Aug. 30, 2007), available at http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/preview/phoenix.zhtml?c=75042&p=irol-sec&secCat01.1_rs=61&secCat01.1_rc=10 (follow 
―6/18/07 8-K‖ hyperlink; then follow ―Page 3 – Subdocument 2 – EX-99.1). 
14 Memorandum and Order at 13, Genesco Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-II(III) (Tenn. 
Ch. Ct. filed Dec. 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.genesco.com/?g=litigation_library.litigation_library (follow ―57 Memorandum and 
Order‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Decision]. 
15 Answer, supra note 9, at 22; Update 1-Finish Line Says UBS Concerned about Genesco, REUTERS, Sept. 14, 
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersnew/idusn1422920320070914.  
16 Answer, supra note 9, at 22. 
17 Id. 
18 Complaint, supra note 1, at 20. 
19 Id. at 1, 2. 
20 Id. at 29-33. 
21 Memorandum and Order at 3, Genesco Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-II(III) (Tenn. 
Ch. Ct. filed Nov. 29, 2007) available at 
http://www.genesco.com/?g=litigation_library.litigation_library (follow ―51 Memorandum and 
Order‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Pretrial Order]. 
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the court also held that Genesco fell within the carve-out exception and was entitled 
to specific performance.22  The court also issued a Supplemental Order clarifying that 
the Memorandum and Order was not a final order because the issue of insolvency 
would be tried by the New York courts and would affect the finality of the decision 
in the Tennessee lawsuit.23  Prior to the New York trial and before the Tennessee 
court could issue a final decision, Genesco, Finish Line, and UBS settled their 
dispute.24   
Even though the parties settled their dispute prior to final adjudication, the 
Tennessee court‘s handling of the MAC claim and its remarks in evaluating the MAC 
clause provide insight for attorneys on drafting merger agreements and MAC clauses 
governed by Tennessee law.  Part II addresses MAC clauses generally and particularly 
in light of Delaware‘s Tyson case.  Part III analyzes the MAC provision that was at 
issue in Genesco‘s Merger Agreement and Commitment Letter.  This part describes 
not only the factors that led to the occurrence of a MAC, but also the carve-out 
exceptions and the remedy of specific performance.  Part IV provides a brief analysis 
of the impact of Genesco on the current state of law.  Finally, Part V offers a brief 
conclusion about the precedential effect of Genesco and describes its significance for 
attorneys practicing in Tennessee. 
II.  MAC CLAUSES GENERALLY 
A.  Overall Considerations 
MAC clauses25 may be found in various types of contracts but are almost 
always used as closing conditions in merger and acquisition agreements.26  The 
                                                 
22 See infra notes 130, 139, 143 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 151-55, and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 156-62, and accompanying text. 
25 MAC clauses may also be referred to as material adverse effect (―MAE‖) clauses.  Jonathon M. 
Grech, Comment:  “Opting Out”: Defining the Material Adverse Change Clause in a Volatile Economy, 52 
EMORY L.J. 1483, 1484 n.10 (2003) (using MAC and MAE interchangeably throughout the 
Comment); Kari K. Hall, How Big is the Mac?:  Material Adverse Change Clauses in Today’s Acquisition 
Environment, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2003) (stating that ―a material adverse change (MAC) 
clause [is] also called [a] material adverse effect (MAE) clause‖).  But see Kenneth A. Adams, A Legal-
Usage Analysis of “Material Adverse Change” Provisions, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9, 17-20 (2004) 
(arguing that the use of MAC is preferable to the use of MAE); Jordan A. Goldstein, The Efficiency of 
Specific Performance in Stock-for-Stock Mergers, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 747, 749 n.5 (2004) (stating that 
―[a]lthough the difference between an MAE and a MAC is generally cosmetic . . . an MAE clause 
arguably sweeps broader than a MAC‖); Alana A. Zerbe, The Material Adverse Effect Provision:  Multiple 
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inclusion of MAC clauses serve to ―protect the parties from changes in 
circumstances that may occur between the time of directorial approval of the 
agreement and consummation of the transaction.‖27  MAC clauses protect the 
acquiring company by allowing it to withdraw from (or renegotiate) the transaction 
without being liable for breach when an event causing a MAC in the target company 
has occurred.28  MAC clauses also protect the target company by restricting the 
reasons for which an acquiring company may terminate a merger agreement without 
being liable for a breach of contract.29  Accordingly, MAC clauses are essential to 
merger agreements and ―are usually the products of intense negotiation . . . .‖30 
 Given the nature of MAC clauses, they are generally thought of as a method 
of allocating risk between the target and acquiror for the interim between the signing 
of the agreement and the closing of the deal.31  In negotiating the construction of the 
clause, the acquiring company and the target company have very different objectives.  
The acquiring company will draft a broad provision that allows maximum freedom 
to terminate or renegotiate the deal.32  On the other hand, the target company will 
fight for a narrow provision that ―ensure[s] that the deal goes forward—no matter 
what.‖33  The target company may be able to restrict the applicability of the provision 
by narrowly defining the term ―material‖ or by including several carve-out 
                                                                                                                                     
Interpretations & Surprising Remedies, 22 U. PITT. J.L. & COM. 17, 17 n.1 (2002) (noting a distinction 
between an MAC and an MAE but conceding that the two are often used interchangeably in practice).  
In this article, the terms MAC and MAE are used synonymously.   
26 Grech, supra note 25, at 1484. 
27 Celia R. Taylor, When Good Mergers Go Bad:  Controlling Corporate Managers Who Suffer a Change of Heart, 
37 U. RICH. L. REV. 577, 586 (2003); see also Hall, supra note 25, at 1062. 
28 Taylor, supra note 27, at 586-87.  
29 Id. at 587-88. 
30 Id. at 587.  
31 Yair Y. Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 846, 
848 (2002); Sherri L. Toub, Note, “Buyer’s Regret” No Longer:  Drafting Effective MAC Clauses in a Post-
IBP Environment, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 849, 853-54 (2003). 
32 Hall, supra note 25, at 1064; Taylor, supra note 27, at 588; Toub, supra note 31, at 854. 
33 Toub, supra note 31, at 854; see also Hall, supra note 25, at 1064; Taylor, supra note 27, at 587-88. 
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exceptions.34  By drafting a narrow definition of ―material‖ or providing specific 
carve-out exceptions as to what will not be considered a MAC, the target company 
may limit the acquiring company‘s ability to invoke the MAC clause as a method of 
terminating the agreement.35  For example, the provision may state that a fifty 
percent or greater loss in earnings constitutes a MAC.  Under this MAC clause, the 
acquiror may fail to close and terminate the merger agreement without liability if the 
target company experiences a loss of fifty percent of its earnings prior to closing.  
 Despite the benefits of specifically defining materiality for purposes of a 
MAC clause, most merger agreements use a vague definition of materiality with large 
carve-out provisions, leaving the determination of what constitutes a MAC to the 
courts.36  Courts interpreting a broad MAC clause tend to use a fact-intensive 
analysis.37  Because courts evaluate the facts in the context of each case, establishing 
a strict quantitative standard for determining materiality is impossible absent a clear, 
express, and exclusive definition of materiality in the agreement.38  Although other 
areas of law have defined materiality, those definitions fail to provide definitive 
guidance when interpreting MAC clauses.39  The 2001 Delaware Chancery Court case 
                                                 
34 See Hall, supra note 25, at 1064; Taylor, supra note 27, at 588; Toub, supra note 31, at 895-901; see also 
Richard E. Climan et al., Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 219, 237-
40 (2002) (discussing carve-outs).  Carve-outs are specific circumstances that the drafter lists as not 
constituting a MAC.  Toub, supra note 31, at 900-01.  
35 Hall, supra note 25, at 1063-64. 
36 See Hall, supra note 25, at 1064.  
37 Jeffrey T. Cicarella, Note, Wake of Death:  How the Current MAC Standard Circumvents the Purpose of the 
MAC Clause, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 423, 430 (2007). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 431.  For example, the SEC has a clear definition of what is material in certain contexts.  E.g., 
17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2008) (―The term material, when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing 
of information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters to which there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to 
purchase the security registered.‖); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2008) (―The term ―material,‖ when used to 
qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information 
required to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
attach importance in determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered.‖).  Additionally, the 
United States Supreme Court has held that determining materiality under SEC Rule 10b-5 ―requires 
delicate assessments of the inferences a ‗reasonable shareholder‘ would draw from a given set of facts 
and the significance of those inferences to him . . . .‖  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) 
(citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976)).  The same ―reasonableness‖ 
test has been applied to defining materiality as to one‘s fiduciary duty of care.  See Jordan v. Fed. 
Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1016 n.18 (3d Cir. 1997).  However, these definitions should not be 
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of IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.40 (―Tyson‖) is the seminal case upon which most 
jurisdictions rely when interpreting MAC clauses.41  While Tennessee is a Model 
Business Corporation Act jurisdiction,42 the chancery court in Genesco relied heavily 
on the Delaware authority provided in Tyson.43  
B.  Tyson and Delaware Law 
Delaware Chancery Court‘s landmark opinion in Tyson was the first 
significant decision to ―focus[] almost entirely on the interpretation of MAC clauses 
in merger agreements.‖44  The controversy in Tyson arose from a merger agreement 
between Tyson, ―the nation‘s leading chicken distributor,‖ and IBP, ―the nation‘s 
number one beef and number two pork distributor.‖45  Tyson acquired IBP in an 
auction for $30 per share in cash, stock, or a combination of cash and stock.46  Tyson 
pursued this deal despite having ―a great deal of information‖ that suggested IBP 
faced financial difficulty.47  During the auction, Tyson learned that DFG, a subsidiary 
of IBP, ―had been victimized by accounting fraud . . . and . . . was the active subject 
                                                                                                                                     
applied to a MAC clause, because investors in securities and acquirors of businesses may have 
different criteria for determining whether something is material.  Cicarella, supra note 31, at 431; see 
also Adams, supra note 37, at 23-24.  
40 IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).  
41 Cicarella, supra note 37, at 432. 
42 See Kradel v. Piper Indus., Inc., 60 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tenn. 2001) (explaining that the Tennessee 
Business Corporation Act ―was patterned in large part after the Revised Model Business Corporation 
Act of 1984‖). 
43 Decision, supra note 14, at 34.  The chancery court‘s reliance on Delaware authority is not 
unprecedented as Tennessee courts have often looked to Delaware corporation law for guidance 
when the Tennessee Business Corporation Act and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act are 
not helpful.  See McCarthy v. Middle Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp., 466 F.3d 399, 409 (6th Cir. 
2006) (stating that ―Delaware‘s judiciary are recognized as specialists in the field of corporate law.  
Courts of other states consider the decisions of Delaware courts on corporate matters to be 
instructive‖). 
44 Toub, supra note 31, at 871.  
45 IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14, 21 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
46 Id. at 21-22, 40.  
47 Id. at 22.  
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of an asset impairment study.‖48  After signing the merger agreement, Tyson 
presented the merger to its stockholders and argued that IBP was a valuable 
acquisition despite ―the cyclical nature of IBP‘s business.‖49  Persuaded by these 
arguments, Tyson‘s stockholders ratified the merger agreement and authorized 
management to take the necessary steps to effectuate the merger.50 
During the winter and spring following the stockholders‘ approval of the 
merger, both Tyson and IBP experienced poor earnings performances.51  The 
problems at both companies were primarily due to a severe winter that adversely 
affected livestock.52  In addition, an accounting fraud was discovered at DFG, and 
Tyson was informed that the subsidiary faced impairment charges.53  Experiencing 
―buyer‘s regret,‖ Tyson delayed and lost interest in pursuing the merger.54  In March 
2001, Don Tyson, Tyson‘s founder and controlling stockholder, abandoned the 
merger.55  
After deciding to renounce the merger, Tyson‘s legal team promptly sent a 
letter to IBP terminating the agreement.56  In addition, Tyson sued IBP for 
fraudulently inducing the merger.57  In response, IBP moved for specific 
performance of the merger agreement.58  Tyson argued that it had the right to 
terminate the agreement because ―the DFG Impairment Charge as well as IBP‘s 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 37.  
54 Id. at 22.  
55 Id. at 22-23. 
56 Id. at 23.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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disappointing first quarter 2001 performance [were] evidence of a Material Adverse 
Effect.‖59 
 In assessing the MAC claims, the Delaware Chancery Court used general 
principles of contract law to guide its decision.60  Specifically, the court applied New 
York law as provided in the choice of law provision in the merger agreement.61 Using 
New York contract law, the court attempted to interpret the parties‘ expressions by 
considering their reasonable expectations at the time they entered into the 
agreement.62  To accomplish this, the court examined the MAC clause in light of the 
entire merger agreement.63  If the agreement was ambiguous as to the parties‘ 
intentions, then the court would examine extrinsic evidence of communications 
between the parties to resolve the ambiguity.64 
Initially, the Tyson Court examined the definition of MAC provided in the 
merger agreement.65  The merger agreement provided, in relevant part, that 
a material adverse effect (or ―MAE‖) is defined as ‗any event, 
occurrence or development of a state of circumstances or 
facts which has had or reasonably could be expected to have 
a Material Adverse Effect‘ . . . ‗on the condition (financial or 
                                                 
59 Id. at 52.  Tyson also asserted that IBP breached its contractual representations and that the 
agreement was fraudulently induced.  Id.  However, these arguments are not pertinent to the 
discussion in this article.  Also, the Tyson opinion uses MAC and MAE interchangeably.  See supra note 
25 and accompanying text. 
60 See Taylor, supra note 27, at 580-81.  
61 Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d at 52.  While Tyson applies New York contract law in analyzing a MAC 
clause, the Delaware Chancery Court later adopted the Tyson Court‘s reasoning for use in cases 
construed under Delaware contract law.  See, e.g., Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Pharmacia Corp., 788 
A.2d 544, 557 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
62 Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d at 55. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 65.  
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otherwise), business, assets, liabilities or results of operation 
of [IBP] and [its] Subsidiaries taken as a whole . . . .‘66  
Given the breadth of the definition, the court found the interpretation of the 
provision to be a ―dauntingly complex‖ task.67  To determine the scope of the MAC 
clause, the court used an objective standard to define materiality and employed a 
reference point of ―a reasonable investor or acquiror having the same total mix of 
information that Tyson possessed.‖68  The court also considered IBP‘s argument that 
the MAC clause contained an implicit carve-out exception for swings in livestock 
supply.69  IBP argued that the parties derived the carve-out exception from the 
financial statements IBP submitted with the merger agreement expressing the 
business‘s cyclical nature.70  Despite IBP‘s assertions, the court was not persuaded by 
this argument and refused to read implicit provisions into the MAC clause.71  The 
court stated that ―[h]ad IBP wished such an exclusion from the broad language of 
[the MAC clause], IBP should have bargained for it.‖72  Thus, the express terms of 
the negotiated merger agreement were respected by the court in its determination of 
whether a MAC occurred.73 
 Three important points must be emphasized from the court‘s statements.  
First, in considering the MAC clause in light of the agreement as a whole, the court 
narrowly interpreted the MAC clause in favor of IBP, the target.74  Second, in 
interpreting the parties‘ intentions, the court was reluctant to read any implicit 
provisions into the MAC clause that were not explicitly bargained for by the parties.75  
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 63.  
69 Id. at 66. 
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 54-55, 66. 
75 Id. at 66.  
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Third, the court recognized that this MAC provision allowed for factors outside of 
IBP‘s control that affected IBP‘s business to be considered a MAC.76  Despite its 
willingness to consider external factors, the court was not persuaded by Tyson‘s 
assertion that it had a right to terminate the merger agreement solely because of the 
downturn in cattle supply.77  To invoke the MAC clause, Tyson had to prove the 
downturn in cattle supply was material.78  
 The Tyson Court looked disfavorably upon the fact that Tyson did not claim a 
MAC when it initially terminated the merger agreement.79  The court found that this 
delay suggested two things:  (1) that Tyson did not consider IBP‘s short term slump 
to be a MAC80 and (2) that Tyson‘s assertion that a MAC occurred was a post-hoc 
argument prepared in hindsight to justify a course of action.81  The court also noted 
that Tyson knew of IBP‘s cyclical nature during its negotiations with IBP.82  In fact, 
prior to the execution and delivery of the merger agreement, Tyson knew of a 
projected decrease in cattle supply that would adversely affect profitability until 2004, 
three years after the merger.83  The court stated that ―[t]hese negotiating realities bear 
on the interpretation of [the MAC clause] and suggest that the contractual language 
must be read in the larger context in which the parties were transacting.‖84  As a 
result of the information provided to Tyson during the negotiation process, it was 
obvious to the court that Tyson was interested in a long-term strategy rather than 
short-term profitability.85  Based on the nature of Tyson‘s interest in IBP and New 
York case law indicating that buyers must have a strong case to invoke a MAC claim, 
                                                 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 65.  
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 67. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
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thereby placing the burden on the acquiror,86 the court found that IBP did not 
experience a MAC.87  
 The Tyson Court held that ―even where a Material Adverse Effect condition 
is as broadly written as the one in [this] Merger Agreement, that provision is best 
read as a backstop protecting the acquiror from the occurrence of unknown events 
that substantially threaten the overall earnings potential of the target in a 
durationally-significant manner.‖88  Therefore, ―[a] short-term hiccup in earnings 
should not suffice; rather the Material Adverse Effect should be material when 
viewed from the longer-term perspective of a reasonable acquiror.‖89   
 The court‘s definition of the materiality standard in Tyson—a facially 
objective standard focused on the reasonable acquiror90—represents an important 
step in interpreting MAC clauses.   However, two reasonable acquirors may have 
different perspectives.  The Tyson Court‘s use of a contextual analysis in applying this 
standard91 is also significant.  Because companies will often consider the long-term 
outcomes of the merger and the reasonable expectations credited by the court will be 
those of a long-term investor, the amount of time over which the complainant must 
show a material adverse effect or change will be increased.  Accordingly, Tyson sets a 
very ―target-friendly‖ standard to be applied when interpreting broadly drafted MAC 
provisions.  
 In addition to concluding that Tyson was unable to invoke the MAC clause 
to terminate the IBP merger, the court considered the potential remedy of specific 
performance.92  Consistent with its MAC analysis, the court used New York law to 
determine the proper remedy.93  Under both New York and Delaware law, the target 
                                                 
86 Id. at 68.   
87 Id. at 71. 
88 Id. at 68. 
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 67. 
92 Id. at 82.  
93 Id. at 53. 
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has the burden of persuasion in proving entitlement to specific performance in an 
action for breach of a merger agreement by an acquiror.94  In New York, the burden 
of proof is by a preponderance of evidence,95 whereas, in most states, including 
Delaware, the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence.96  This distinction is 
particularly important in Tyson given the court‘s uncomfortable admission that it 
reached its conclusion ―with less than the optimal amount of confidence.‖97  
Additionally, the court stated that IBP met the preponderance of evidence standard 
of proof, and even if the court incorrectly decided the proper burden to apply, the 
evidence met the clear and convincing standard.98  The Genesco Court adopted this 
style of reasoning. 
III.  GENESCO’S MAC CLAUSE 
In Genesco, the Merger Agreement used the term ―Company Material Adverse 
Effect‖ (―MAE‖), defined in Section 3.1(a) to ―mean any event, circumstance, 
change or effect that, individually or in the aggregate, is materially adverse to the 
business, condition (financial or otherwise), assets, liabilities or results of operations 
of the Company and the Company Subsidiaries, taken as a whole . . . .‖99  As in Tyson, 
the parties in Genesco used the terms MAC and MAE interchangeably.100  The Merger 
Agreement did not define ―material‖ in the context of a MAC or in any other 
context.101  However, the court interpreted the words ―material,‖ ―adverse,‖ and ―as 
a whole‖ to require that ―the change in the target company‘s business . . . be 
                                                 
94 Id. at 52.  The court states that in order to succeed in plea for specific performance  ―[u]nder New 
York law, IBP must show that: (1) the Merger Agreement is a valid contract between the parties; (2) 
IBP has substantially performed under the contract and is willing and able to perform its remaining 
obligations; (3) Tyson is able to perform its obligations; and (4) IBP has no adequate remedy at law.‖  
Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 71. 
98 Id. at 72 n. 172.   
99 Merger Agreement, supra note 7, Ex. 2.1, at 8. 
100 Decision, supra note 14, at 34; see also sources cited, supra note 59 (discussing the Tyson Court‘s use 
of MAC and MAE interchangeably).  
101 See Merger Agreement, supra note 7, Ex. 2.1, at 8-9. 
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significant‖ to constitute a MAC.102  The court further required that ―[c]ommon 
sense considerations such as [1] the duration of the change, [2] the measure of the 
change and [3] whether the change relates to an essential purpose or purposes the 
parties sought to achieve by entering into the merger‖ be used to determine whether 
a MAC has occurred.103  Similar to the court‘s approach in Tyson, the Genesco Court 
stated that these decisions must be made in ―reference to the context and 
circumstances of the merger.‖104 
In evaluating whether the MAC clause was triggered, the court reviewed 
whether the adverse changes asserted by Finish Line were specifically excluded under 
the carve-out provisions before discussing whether a MAC actually occurred.105  
Commentators have noted that this order of reasoning seems backwards.106  The 
remainder of this Part will first discuss the court‘s determination of whether a MAC 
occurred and then discuss the applicability of the carve-out provisions in the MAC. 
A.  Occurrence of a MAC 
To determine whether a MAC occurred, the Genesco Court considered the 
length of time over which the adverse effects alleged by Finish Line endured to 
determine if the effects were material.107  In arguing whether the duration of the 
effects was significant, both parties ―latched onto‖ the Delaware court‘s statement 
―in Tyson that a ‗blip‘ in earnings does not constitute a[] MAE.‖108  Rather than 
following the lead of the parties, the court opted to focus on the express language of 
Section 7.2(b) of the Merger Agreement.109  This provision stated that ―[s]ince the 
date of this Agreement, there shall not have occurred a Company Material Adverse 
                                                 
102 Decision, supra note 14, at 34. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 29-37. 
106 Genesco v. Finish Line:  The Opinion, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2007/12/genesco-the-opi.html (Dec. 28, 2007). 
107 Decision, supra note 14, at 35-36. 
108 Id. at 35. 
109 Id.   
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Effect with respect to the Company and the Company Subsidiaries, considered as a 
whole, that has not been cured prior to the Termination Date.‖110  The Genesco Court 
viewed this ―drop dead‖ date termination provision as ―an acknowledgement by the 
parties that in the context of this merger a[] MAE can occur in three or four 
months.‖111   
The court reasoned that, if a MAE can occur in as little as three or four 
months, then the combination of lower second and third-quarter earnings was an 
adverse effect of significant duration.112  The Tyson Court stated that ―[a] short-term 
hiccup in earnings should not suffice; rather the [MAE] should be material when 
viewed form the longer-term perspective of a reasonable acquiror.‖113  The Tyson 
merger agreement was signed on January 1, 2001 but referred to MAC events that 
occurred after December 25, 1999.114  Thus, the length of time required for a MAC 
to have occurred was significantly shorter in Genesco than in Tyson.   
The Genesco Court also considered whether the change was large enough to 
be considered material.115  In concluding that the identified changes were 
quantitatively significant, the court stated that there was ―no offset or mitigation of 
the [second quarter] and [third quarter] declines to remove 2007 as one of the lowest 
earnings in [ten] years.‖116  Failure to meet published projections was specifically 
excluded as a MAC in the Merger Agreement;117 however, the Merger Agreement 
provided that the facts and circumstances underlying the missed projections could be 
used to determine if a MAC has occurred.118   
                                                 
110 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 35-36. 
113 Id. at 68.   
114 IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14, 22, 67 (Del. Ch. 2001).  
115 Decision, supra note 14, at 34-36. 
116 Id. at 35. 
117 Id. at 30; Merger Agreement, supra note 7, Ex. 2.1, at 9. 
118 Decision, supra note 14, at 30; Merger Agreement, supra note 7, Ex. 2.1, at 9. 
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In February 2007, Genesco missed its projections by $1.7 million.119  In May 
2007, Genesco missed its projections by $2.1 million.120  In June 2007, it missed its 
projections by $4.7 million.121  During the third quarter, Genesco again missed its 
projections by $10 million.122  During May 2006, Genesco returned poor earnings but 
recovered in the fourth quarter to have a profitable year.123  Although Genesco‘s 
annual earnings increased above the May 2007 projections, the increase failed to 
offset the second quarter losses.124  Because the drastic deviation of actual earnings 
from Genesco‘s projections greatly reduced the company‘s net income, the court 
determined that the change in earnings was significant.125 
The last factor the court reviewed was whether the MAE affected an 
essential purpose sought by the parties in the merger.126  The court found that Finish 
Line‘s principal goals in consummating the merger were threefold:  (1) to diversify 
the company, (2) to recognize synergies from reduced costs, and (3) to provide 
growth opportunities.127  The court stated that if the merger was completed, 
Genesco‘s decreased earnings would not affect the goals of diversification and 
synergies.128  However, Finish Line intended to finance the deal entirely with debt 
with up to 70% of the debt payments being paid from Genesco‘s operating revenue 
after the merger was completed.129  The court took into account the fact that 
―Genesco‘s decline in earnings affect[ed] the ability of the merged entity to pay its 
                                                 
119 Decision, supra note 14, at 10. 
120 Id.   
121 Id. 
122 Id.  
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 10, 35-36. 
125 Id. at 34, 36. 
126 Id. at 36-37.   
127 Id. at 36. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 36-37.  
2008]                   MATERIAL ADVERSE CHANGE CLAUSES IN TENNESSEE         359 
 
 359 
financing and have money left over to grow the company.‖130  The court concluded 
that the ability of the merged company to grow was an essential purpose of the 
transaction to Finish Line and that Genesco‘s decreased earnings materially and 
adversely changed that outcome.131  Thus, without giving effect to the express 
contractual exceptions, the court determined that Genesco suffered a MAE.132 
B.  Carve-Out Exceptions 
In determining whether a MAE provision is triggered, the court must review 
the carve-outs negotiated by the parties.133  The Merger Agreement provided that the 
following does not constitute a MAE:  
 . . . (B) changes in the national or world economy or financial 
markets as a whole or changes in general economic conditions that 
affect the industries in which the Company and the Company 
Subsidiaries conduct their business, so long as such changes or 
conditions do not adversely affect the Company and the Company 
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, in a materially disproportionate 
manner relative to other similarly situated participants in the 
industries or markets in which they operate; . . . (D) the failure, in and 
of itself, of the Company to meet any published or internally 
prepared estimates of revenues, earnings or other financial 
projections, performance measures or operating statistics; provided, 
however, that the facts and circumstances underlying any such failure 
may, except as may be provided in subsection (A), (B), (C), (E), 
(F) and (G) of this definition, be considered in determining whether a 
Company Material Adverse Effect has occurred; . . . and (G) acts or 
omissions of Parent or Merger Sub after the date of this Agreement 
(other than actions or omissions specifically contemplated by this 
Agreement).134  
                                                 
130 Id. at 37. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 33, 37. 
133 Id. at 29-31. 
134 Id. at 29-30; Merger Agreement, supra note 7, Ex. 2.1, at 9. 
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To determine whether any of these carve-outs apply to the adverse effects 
documented by Finish Line, the court weighed the testimony presented at trial 
concerning the cause of Genesco‘s lost profits.135  Experts from each side gave 
testimony regarding both general conditions and industry-specific conditions.136  The 
court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Genesco‘s performance in 2007 
was ―due to general economic conditions such as higher gasoline, heating oil and 
food prices, housing and mortgage issues, and increased consumer debt loads.‖137  
The court‘s reliance on in-court testimony was consistent with the facts and 
circumstances approach used in Tyson.138  The court gave substantial weight to the 
testimony of Duane Cantrell, former president and director of Payless Shoe Stores.139  
The court cited ―Mr. Cantrell‘s retail experience . . . as well as the breadth of the 
sources he identifies‖ as the most persuasive testimony in finding that Genesco‘s 
decreased revenues were due to general economic conditions.140     
The defined MAE carves-out a change in general economic conditions that 
materially affects the company; therefore, the Merger Agreement exempted this 
MAE from coverage under the closing condition.141  Accordingly, the Genesco Court 
held that Finish Line‘s actions in failing to consummate the merger breached the 
Merger Agreement and, pending a decision on the solvency of the merged entity by a 
New York court, Finish Line was required to merge with Genesco.142   
C.  Specific Performance 
Rather than applying the specific performance provision in the Merger 
Agreement, the Genesco Court applied Tennessee law to determine whether specific 
                                                 
135 Decision, supra note 14, at 31-33.  
136 Id. at 31-32. 
137 Id. at 31. 
138 See IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14, 67 (Del. Ch. 2001) (discussing the factual analysis). 
139 Decision, supra note 14, at 31. 
140 Id. at 32.  
141 Id. at 33. 
142 Id. at 3. 
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performance was a proper remedy for Finish Line‘s breach.143  This reliance on state 
law is similar to the Tyson Court‘s reliance on New York law to decide whether 
specific performance was appropriate.144  Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of 
Genesco and granted specific performance to remedy the harm caused by the delay 
of the merger.145   
Tennessee law allows specific performance to be granted if there is no 
adequate remedy at law, no suspicion of fraud, and enforcing specific performance 
will not be ―harsh, inequitable, or oppressive.‖146  After evaluating these factors, the 
Genesco Court found that Genesco could be granted specific performance.147  The 
court held that the ―facts proven at trial establish irreparable harm and that the 
payment of damages is not an adequate remedy.‖148  The court also found ―as a 
matter of law[,] that Genesco did not commit fraud‖ because Genesco had no 
affirmative duty to release documents to Finish Line unless Finish Line requested 
these documents.149   
In addressing whether the specific performance would be harsh, inequitable, 
or oppressive, the court determined that specific performance would be oppressive if 
the resulting company was insolvent and could not continue with its business 
practice.150  Evidence of solvency was carved out of the trial and reserved for a 
lawsuit filed by UBS in New York on the Commitment Letter.151  Thus, the 
Chancellor ordered specific performance but recognized that a determination by the 
                                                 
143 Id. at 39.   
144 IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14, 53 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
145 Decision, supra note 14, at 3, 42. 
146 Id. at 39.  
147 Id. at 3, 39. 
148 Id. at 40. 
149 Id. at 27, 41. 
150 Id. at 42. 
151 Id. at 3, 42.   
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New York court that the merger would result in an insolvent entity would halt the 
merger.152   
Proof of insolvency was not presented to the court because it was an issue 
for New York law under the choice of law provision in the Commitment Letter; 
therefore, the Tennessee court withheld judgment regarding the solvency of the 
merged entity.153  A determination of insolvency by the New York court could have 
precluded the merger in spite of the Tennessee court‘s order that the merger must go 
forward.154  Because this aspect of the decision was somewhat unclear, a few days 
after the issuance of the court‘s Memorandum and Order, the court issued a 
Supplemental Order stating that the court‘s order was not a final opinion and would 
not be final until the litigation in New York was complete.155   
The Supplemental Order reiterated the fact that the insolvency of a 
combined Genesco-Finish Line could make Finish Line‘s performance under the 
Merger Agreement impossible.156  Such a finding would force Finish Line to return 
to the Tennessee courts to argue that the commercial purpose of the Merger 
Agreement was frustrated and that Finish Line‘s performance under the Merger 
Agreement was excused.157   
D.  Settlement 
On March 4, 2008, Genesco, UBS, and Finish Line settled their disputes out 
of court before beginning the solvency trial in New York.158  In their settlement 
                                                 
152 Id.   
153 Id. at 42. 
154 Id. at 42; Order at 2, Genesco Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-II(III) (Tenn. Ch. Ct. filed 
Jan. 2, 2008), available at http://www.genesco.com/?g=litigation_library.litigation_library (follow ―58 
Order‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Supplemental Order].   
155 Supplemental Order, supra note 152, at 1, 2. 
156 Id. at 2.   
157 Id.   
158 Genesco Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Exhibit 10.1, at 2 (Mar. 4, 2008), available at 
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/preview/phoenix.zhtml?c=75042&p=irol-
sec&secCat01.1_rs=11&secCat01.1_rc=10 (follow ―3/4/08 8-K‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Settlement 
Agreement]. 
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agreement, Finish Line and UBS agreed to pay Genesco $175 million and to 
distribute twelve percent of the shares of Finish Line stock to Genesco‘s 
shareholders.159  The parties agreed to settle all outstanding litigation, and Finish Line 
and Genesco instituted a standstill agreement forbidding either party from acquiring 
ownership interest in the other party, combining with the other company, or 
influencing the control or management of the other party.160  The settlement 
agreement also included a release of all claims against Finish Line, Genesco, and 
UBS.161   
At least one commentator has speculated that the pretrial deposition of the 
controller for Finish Line—showing that the merged entity would not be solvent—
propelled the parties to settle.162  The commentator stated that, had the New York 
court found the merged entity insolvent, UBS would have been released from the 
financing obligation and Genesco and Finish Line would have returned to 
Tennessee, where the judge would have been compelled to fashion some 
unpredictable solution.163  These prospects, or the prohibitive legal fees, could have 
induced the parties to settle.164 
IV.  IMPACT OF GENESCO 
The precedential weight of the Genesco decision may be limited beyond the 
fact that it is not a final decision.165  Specifically, it may be limited by the express 
language of the Merger Agreement relied upon by the court in determining whether a 
MAC had occurred.  In Tyson, the court viewed materiality ―from the longer-term 
perspective of a reasonable acquirer‖166 because the definition of ―material‖ was 
                                                 
159 Id. at Exhibit 10.1, at 3. 
160 Id. at Exhibit 10.1, at 7. 
161 Id. at Exhibit 10.1, at 3. 
162 Steven M. Davidoff, Lessons from the Genesco Fight, DEALBOOK, Mar. 4, 2008, 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/lessons-from-the-genesco-fight/.  
163 Id.  
164 Id. 
165 Id.; Genesco v. Finish Line:  The Opinion, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2007/12/genesco-the-opi.html (Dec. 28, 2007). 
166 IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
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vague and extrinsic evidence was admitted to determine what constituted material.167  
In comparison to Tyson, the Genesco Court relied on language in the Merger 
Agreement that allowed a MAC to be cured within approximately six months of the 
date of the Merger Agreement.168  The court found that this contractual language 
served as an implicit recognition by the parties that a MAC could occur during such 
a short period.169  
The Genesco Court‘s finding that a MAC occurred in such a short period of 
time contradicts the Tyson decision.  However, this contradiction rests squarely on 
the language of the MAC provision.  Both courts focused on an intense examination 
of the parties‘ intentions and gave great deference to the language of the negotiated 
merger agreements.  Because repaying the debt out of Genesco‘s profits was a 
material purpose of the merger, the court reasoned that the intentions and 
expectations of the parties contained a shorter-term view and concluded that the 
decline in Genesco‘s earnings constituted a MAC.170  This result is contrary to Tyson 
in which the court held that the parties entered into the merger with long-term 
intentions and predicted decreased profits in the near future, thereby leading the 
court to conclude that short-term losses did not constitute a MAC.171 
Genesco‘s precedential effect could also be limited because its result relies on 
an express exception within the MAC definition.172  The overall MAC clause was 
drafted broadly and specifically included many things often regarded as MACs.173  
However, the drafting and negotiation decisions in the Genesco-Finish Line 
agreement to exclude a large number of occurrences that normally constitute a MAC 
significantly limit the power of the particular MAC clause.   
                                                 
167 Id. at 65-66. 
168 The merger agreement was signed on June 17, 2007, and included a termination provision that 
allowed either party to cure a MAC before December 31, 2007, a time period of approximately six 
months.  Decision, supra note 14, at 35. 
169 Id.  
170 Decision, supra note 14, at 37. 
171 Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d at 68, 69. 
172 Decision, supra note 14, at 33 (finding that ―Genesco fits within one of the MAE carve-outs‖).   
173 Id. at 29-30. 
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The importance of the Genesco decision may be its lessons for future drafters 
who must focus on drafting MAC exclusions that either minimize or maximize the 
number and kind of events that may be considered a MAC.  Under Genesco, these 
exclusions may narrow the scope of materiality or the changes or effects that permit 
termination without constituting a breach of the agreement. 
Given the Genesco Court‘s reliance on the ―drop dead‖ date termination 
provision in the Merger Agreement, a question arises as to whether a subsequent 
drafter could avoid the Genesco result in a merger governed by Tennessee law by 
removing or rewriting the ―drop dead‖ date termination provision.  It is unclear 
whether, and if so, under what circumstances, a Tennessee court would view the 
length of time in which a MAC can occur under a more long-term view, as used in 
Tyson, as opposed to the shorter-term contract-based view used in Genesco.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
While it is too early to foretell the effects of the Genesco holding on the 
interpretation of MAC provisions in Tennessee, much can be learned from this 
decision. Both the Genesco Court and the Tyson Court used a very fact- and 
document-based review of the parties‘ intentions to determine whether an event was 
material in the context of the merger.  In Tyson, the issue of specific performance was 
heavily litigated, while in Genesco specific performance was specifically provided for in 
the Merger Agreement.  While Tyson focused on the intention of the parties from the 
perspective of a long-term acquiror, the Genesco Court found that specific short-term 
objectives were material to the parties that shortened the length of time in which a 
MAC could occur.  It is clear that in future cases, the interpretation of MAC 
provisions in Tennessee will depend both on the intention of the parties and the 
carve-out provisions negotiated in the merger agreement.  
 
